Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. 3rd Edition. The Free Press, New York.

In the history of Mankind, much has been given to the study of warfare and less to the study of causes. Though on a case-by-case basis, war historians have dwelled on reasons that led to individual war. But not much has been written on an all-encompassing theory on the causes of war, if there is such a theory.

Blainey, previously a Professor of Economic History at University of Melbourne, attempted to do such that in this book. However he ended up in debunking many all-encompassing theories put forward before. In short, there is no such theory. But this book makes an interesting read because he juxtaposed many possible causes of war into just one book which before were scattered in millions of pages of war literature. Blainey, in this book, concerned himself with wars from 1700 to 1970.

What is war?
War itself provides the most reliable and objective test of relative strength between countries to settle conflicts. What could be dearer than having our lives at stakes--every other thing can be gained or lost but not for our lives.

War-weariness and war fever
Often historians personified country as individual. French was exhausted or Europe was exhausted which explains the ensuing long period of peace from 1815 to 1913 after the Napoleonic War. When the gory memories of war were effaced by those participated died out and those have-nots growing up, this might explain the enthusiasms greeted the outbreak of WWI. However historians have a difficult time in explaining the mere 25 years of peace between the two great world wars of the 20th century.

Scapegoat
Another favourite theory among historians is that wars divert the nation's attention from its internal woes to its imaginary external conflict. In the last decade of the 20th century, some of us have attributed Clinton's decision to bomb Kosova in order to deflect the media from his impending impeachment; and Senior Bush's onslaught on Saddam Hussein was to give Bush a breather from US's economics woes. Or, Junior Bush's invasion of Iraq and his fight against the elusive and obiquitous terrorists is a take from his dad.

It's the economic, stupid!
Alec Lawrence Macfie in his "The Outbreak of War and the Trade Cycle" argued that international wars were most likely to begin when an economic recovery was well under way or has reached a prosperous plateau. A quick study of the outbreak of 12 international wars in the period from 1850 to 1914 suggested this pattern. Of course, I'll cautious this theory since correlation does not imply causation. But if this proves to be true, then decision makers are extremely rational on whether their war chest will last them to their victory. In modern warfare, the victory goes not to the mightier but to the one who outlast his opponent-or the one with a deeper pocket.

Psychological
Brainey has come out with compelling reasons that decision makers overestimated their strength in war. In the case of WWI, most of the participants confidently believed that victory would be theirs within six months, at worst a year; yet the war lasted for four years. The British, knowing their economic might, predicted that Germans would rumbled under its military budget. The Germans, on the other hand, following the tradition of Clausewitz, predicted the war would be short because short and decisive military technology and manoeuvre was German orthodoxy, a field where German was the recognised master.

This point is similar to what I have developed previously during my usual musings. I opine that war is a decision decided not by the many but by the few; these few, more often than not, overestimated what they can gain, underestimated what they can lose, from engaging the war. These few, often, think not what the nation can gain but they themselves can gain from engaging the war.

Let's say for example that a politician consults his generals the possibility of victory if he would enter into a war. Chances are that these generals will be overtly confident. Expression of confidence implies the generals are competent and ready; hence, reflecting well on them. If they, however, express doubts, it will show these generals are living off the charity of public coffers. The interest of each individual decision makers is important in deciding whether war is in the brewing or not.

Leo Kee Chye